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Abstract: In this paper I discuss the idea of a semantic code in the con-
temporary debate between contextualism and minimalism. First, I iden-
tify historical sources of these positions in Grice’s pragmatics and in 
Davidson’s theory of meaning in order to sketch the role of a semantic 
code there. Then I argue that contextualism is committed to the idea of 
an ad hoc code, while minimalism involves a persistent code. However, 
the latter approach to a code requires disambiguation which must be 
carried out in the early stages of speech act processing. I raise a concern 
that primary pragmatic processes may be active here, especially in the 
case of disambiguating polysemous expressions, which could be prob-
lematic or even devastating for the minimalist program. At the end I 
evaluate a possible minimalist way out by examining the minimalist 
account of metaphor, which lies at the root of polysemy. If a code robust 
enough to deal with polysemy could be created, minimalist conceptions 
would present a new impetus to understand language as a code. With-
out such a code, very little would be left of the notion of a persistent 
code and hence of minimalism itself.
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 At the end of the twentieth century, it could have seemed that the 
idea of a semantic code had been discarded. Wittgenstein subsumed 
it under the Augustinian understanding of language, while Quine ad-
dressed it in his myth of a museum. In spite of its apparent rejection, 
the idea has recently inspired renewed interest. Curiously enough, this 
renewed interest has arisen thanks to thinkers who directly or indi-
rectly follow in the footsteps of Wittgenstein and Quine.
 The current debate focuses on the role of (linguistic or non-linguis-
tic) context in communication and linguistics. If we admit the role of 
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context, how do we capture this role in theory? Given that the number 
of possible contexts is limitless, a language user cannot learn all the 
various impacts of the context. Others argue that, in communication 
and linguistics, we need to get by with finite means. This finite knowl-
edge could be captured by a finite code coupled with finite recursive 
rules of composition, in which the understanding of meaning and the 
interaction of meaning with the context is, as it were, sublimated.
 By semantic code I mean a form of mapping that assigns meaning 
to each element of language, usually a word.1 This mapping captures 
language conventions. However, the terms “semantic code” and “lan-
guage convention” are often used interchangeably. For the purposes 
of the present work, this indiscriminate use can be accepted, although 
the link between expressions and their meanings can be constituted in 
other ways, such as naturally (Cratylus’ hypothesis). If we define se-
mantic code on the level of individual words, we obtain a finite map-
ping, as each natural language has only a finite number of words. This 
finite code can be extended into an infinite one using suitable rules of 
composition.
 Two extreme cases of code are worth mentioning. At one extreme, a 
code is defined primarily on the level of sentences; at the other extreme, 
a code is defined on the level of letters. A code defined on the sentence 
level is infinite, as there is infinity of sentences in a natural language. A 
semantic code defined on the level of letters seems almost an absurdity 
(assuming we are concerned with a language that uses letters, such as 
English or Russian). However, strictly speaking, such a code is conceiv-
able, if we systematically describe the semantic effect of each letter in 
the context of the letters that surround it. I mention this only because a 
similar problem pertains to lexical code.
 What do we need a code for when studying language? This ques-
tion can be answered only if we clarify the goals to be achieved by the 
study of language. We can study language in order to create a system-
atic theory of meaning and inference, where “systematic” has to be un-
derstood as “compositional”. Alternatively, we can study language in 
order to create a psychological theory of communication that involves 
such questions as how communication is possible, what our communi-
cation abilities are, and what things we are able to communicate. These 
1 I use “meaning” in a broad sense, which includes Fregean senses, rules, 
stereotypes, etc.
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two aims are not in contradiction; under certain conditions, they can 
even be complementary.2
 What is a semantic code good for, then, if we want to devise a sys-
tematic theory of meaning? The answer is obvious: a semantic code is 
suitable for modeling the semantic relation, because of the composi-
tionality of the semantic code. A theory of meaning that was not based 
on the notion of a semantic code would not be systematic, and, thus, it 
would not meet the initial requirements. In a way, the idea of a seman-
tic code is necessitated by the requirements.
 If we aim to create a theory of communication, the usefulness of the 
semantic code can be clarified using the following transcendental con-
sideration. People understand each other when using language, as they 
share a code. Or more precisely, in order for people to understand each 
other at all, they have to share a code. When a person utters “xsffg”, 
others will not understand the utterance, as the string is not an element 
of the domain of the shared code. By contrast, a person’s utterance “this 
is a writing desk” is readily understood by others. A semantic code is, 
here, a cognitive basis on which the psychological process of under-
standing is constructed. According to this consideration, knowledge of 
language amounts to knowledge of a semantic code, the rules of com-
position, and the rules governing how the code is applied in specific 
situations.
 To sum up, a semantic code can be an idealized condition of the pos-
sibility of a semantic theory without the code’s having any psychologi-
cal reality, and, conversely, a semantic code can have a psychological 
reality without being a condition of the possibility of communication.
 For the sake of the following discussion, three problematic points 
concerning the idea of a semantic code need to be mentioned. The first 
problem is that natural languages undergo change, while a semantic 
code, as an abstract object, is unchanging. If we take a radical stance 
following Quine and Davidson, we can say that languages change from 
moment to moment, a fact that needs to be accounted for in the theo-
retical models of language. From this point of view, two notions of code 
can be distinguished: a code as an abstract persistent object, and a code 
as an object that is constructed in communication ad hoc. One could ob-
2 With a little simplification, the first aim is one of minimalists, while the se-
cond aim is one of contextualists. Compare Borg (2004, 1-3), Jaszczolt (2005) 
or Bach (2011).
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ject that the second notion of a code is so ephemeral that it does not even 
deserve to be called a “semantic code”. However, following the defini-
tion of a semantic code as a mapping between expressions and their 
meanings, such an ephemeral mapping is a semantic code per defini-
tion, no matter how ephemeral and ad hoc it may be. One problem of the 
notion of a shared ad hoc semantic code can be that it does not explain 
the possibility of communication. We cannot explain the possibility of 
communication by pointing to a shared code that has been created no 
sooner than in the very act of communication. The proponents of such 
a notion of a code have to explain how the communication partners ar-
rive at their shared code. In the following, two methods of construction 
of a shared ad hoc code are mentioned. An advantage of ad hoc codes 
is that they work also on the level of sentences, as they need to specify 
the sentence meaning of only a small subset of sentences related to the 
situation at hand rather than the sentence meaning of all possible sen-
tences.
 The second problem of a semantic code may be its ambiguity. Nat-
ural languages contain polysemous expressions and homonyms, i.e. 
words that have more than one meaning. In order for a semantic code to 
be a mapping in the mathematical sense (each member of the domain is 
mapped to at most one member of the codomain) disambiguation needs 
to be done, which consists in assigning indices to terms in such a way 
that each term considered together with its index has exactly one mean-
ing. For example, the word hard can be disambiguated as hard1 (not 
easily penetrated, cut, or separated into parts) or as hard2 (difficult to 
accomplish). The choice of the index of a term depends on the context. 
Capturing rules of disambiguation turns out to be a formidable task, 
as I will show later. The existence of polysemy and homonymy sug-
gests that meaning does not depend exclusively on individual words 
but rather is spread throughout the context of sentences. This problem 
bears an analogy to a semantic code on the level of letters; a lexical code 
is possible if we are able to capture polysemy and homonymy with 
finite means.3 Homonymy and disambiguation that homonymy makes 
necessary present a problem only for the persistent view of a code. If 
3 Wittgenstein (1974, 195) considers the hypothesis that the meaning of a par-
ticular word changes according to the day of the week. Such context de-
pendence is systematic and can be captured in lexical code. However, if the 
meaning changed arbitrarily from day to day or from sentence to sentence, 
such context dependence could be captured in a code only using an infinite 
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a code is constructed ad hoc, homonymy does not emerge (except for 
when it is intentional), as it is resolved when the code is constructed.
1 Historical Background
 Contemporary contextualism in the philosophy of language is the 
result of an effort to elaborate on, or solve, some problems of Gricean 
pragmatics. In fact, the influence of Gricean pragmatics on contextual-
ism is explicitly acknowledged by contextualists themselves. By con-
trast, the intellectual sources of minimalist theories are not so clear. I 
will argue that what lies at the core of minimalism is Davidson’s con-
ception of language enriched with Grice’s terminology and Grice’s the-
ory of communication. However, many elements of Davidson’s con-
ception of language can also be found in contextualism. Thus, a short 
overview of Grice’s and Davidson’s theories seems to be in order.
1.1	 Gricean	Pragmatics
 Most contextualist authors adopt or refine Grice’s basic terminol-
ogy. To an extent, so do the semantic minimalists; semantic minimal-
ism is also called Gricean minimalism. Grice introduces the technical 
terms “what is said” and “what is implicated”. He distinguishes “what 
is said” from conventional meaning or “what is encoded”, although he 
says the two are closely related. Roughly speaking, the transition from 
conventional meaning to what is said is a matter of semantics, while the 
transition from what is said to what is implicated is a matter of prag-
matics. This close relation between conventional meaning and what is 
said is where contextualism picks up the threads of Grice’s work by 
asserting that pragmatic phenomena are active also in this area. The no-
tion of “what is (en)coded” captures the idea of code that is the subject 
of the present text.
 Now I would like to sketch the relationship between conventional 
meaning and “what is said”. In one of his most recent works, Grice 
came up with the notion of centrality of meaning, which has two in-
dependent properties: dictiveness and formality. Grice identifies the dic-
tive content with “what is said”; formality is related to conventional 
number of rules. To put it differently, it would be a code on the sentence 
level .
The Idea of Code in Contextualism and Minimalism ___________________________ 121
meaning.4 We can classify speech acts using these two properties. If 
a speech act has both properties, what is said is determined solely by 
the conventional meaning. The interesting cases are, however, those in 
which one of the two properties is missing. A speech act can lack its dic-
tiveness; that is the case of a conventional implicature. Dictive speech 
acts that lack formality are especially interesting for contextualists. In 
these speech acts, what is said is partially or wholly independent of the 
conventional meaning of a sentence. This allows contextualism to be 
classified into a moderate form or a radical form, depending on whether 
it claims partial or complete independence of what is said on the con-
ventional meaning. If “what is said” is at least partly independent of 
the conventional meaning, then it needs to be explained how this tran-
sition (from the conventional meaning to what is said), generally called 
modulation, is possible. Recanati calls this process “sense enrichment”; 
Sperber and Wilson (2008) speak of the process of a construction of 
meaning; Levinson goes so far as to allow “what is said” to be influ-
enced by implicatures that were derived later. Here I have mentioned 
only the most influential theories.
1.2	 Davidson’s	Minimalist	Conception	of	Meaning
 Davidson aimed at providing an acceptable theory of meaning for 
natural languages. Such a theory should specify what each sentence 
of a language means, and thus capture semantic code on the sentence 
level. Furthermore, a theory of meaning has to be holistic in the follow-
ing sense: “only in the context of the language does a sentence (and 
therefore a word) have meaning.” (2001b, 22) This has to be understood 
in such a way that a theory of meaning must contain all (true) sentences 
“s means m”. This intuitive requirement has led Davidson to use the 
well-known T-scheme: “p” is true if and only if s. Notice that giving the 
truth conditions of the sentence is, as a consequence, a way of giving its 
meaning. The meaning of sentence p is abstracted from all T-sentences 
that have “p” on the left side. But what is the scope of this universal 
quantifier?
4 Some authors identify Grice’s terms “formality” and “dictiveness” with 
Austin’s terms “locutionary” and “illocutionary”. See Bach (2004) or Gar-
cía-Carpintero (2006, 45-46).
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 A theory of meaning is, according to Davidson, an empirical the-
ory that has to answer the question of what the meaning of sentence 
p is, rather than what meaning is per se. This theory has to be empiri-
cally testable on “sample cases”. In these cases, we do not deal merely 
with sentence p, but rather with its particular use, and thus utterance. 
However, Davidson—like later minimalists—explicitly insists that 
truth (and thus also truth conditions) is a property of sentences rather 
than utterances. A language user has available only a finite number 
of specific uses and the scope of the mentioned universal quantifier 
is—although getting broader—finite. Davidson calls such a theory of 
meaning a prior theory, while an extension (and reinterpretation) of the 
theory with the current language situation is called a passing theory. It 
can thus be said that language meaning is knowable in this restricted 
sense, and that if we are concerned with a rational (and psychological) 
reconstruction of human communication, this restriction of the scope of 
the universal operator needs to be taken seriously.
 However, Davidson (and, later, also minimalism) offers a theory of 
meaning for sentences (type) of language. Thus, the scope of the men-
tioned quantifier is still left unspecified. Let us try to make the scope 
as broad as possible. If we are concerned with a theory of meaning for 
a particular language such as, say, English, we need to quantify over 
all possible uses of sentence p in English and, from them, abstract the 
meaning (i.e. truth conditions). Such a conception of meaning can be 
called minimal or minimalistic.
 In the paper “Communication and Convention“, Davidson (2001a) 
questioned whether a shared conventional code is a necessary condi-
tion of communication. In order for communication to be successful, 
the speaker and her addressee need to assign the same meanings to the 
same words (which means that their passing theories have to match). 
Put differently, the addressee has to correctly determine “what is said”, 
i.e. the ad hoc code. In order for this condition to be met, it is not nec-
essary that the speaker and the addressee share a persistent semantic 
code in advance. It does not matter what stands at the beginning of the 
communication process, during which the speaker performs a speech 
act and his addressee tries to figure out what is said; what matters is 
that there is an agreement at the end of the process. In order for this 
agreement to be possible (i.e. in order that the communication is suc-
cessful), the language users have to share the same method of how to 
use their knowledge of language in a particular context. Davidson calls 
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this general process the “radical interpretation”, and later a transition 
from a prior theory to a passing theory. The conventions of language 
enter the process as a “practical crutch”, which sometimes helps and 
sometimes does not or need not. In the contemporary debate, a similar 
style of thought can be found in radical contextualism, as exposed in 
the following section.
2 Contextualism
 I shall present a definition of contextualism that loosely follows Re-
canati (2010b). Recanati defines methodological contextualism as a posi-
tion that admits that the meaning of each expression (rather than the 
meanings of only indexical expressions and demonstratives belonging 
to the basic set) can depend on context. This is followed by two varieties 
of contextualism which share the thesis that knowledge of contextual 
factors is necessary for the determination of the meaning of a sentence. 
Thus, the meaning of a sentence depends on the meanings of its parts, 
on the manner of their composition, and on context. Because of the spe-
cific contextual parameter, we have to speak of the meaning of a spe-
cific utterance (token) instead of the meaning of a sentence (type). Mod-
erate (modulation based) contextualism is based on the assumption that 
the meaning of an expression is insufficient (and often unnecessary) 
for determining the meaning of an utterance that uses the expression. 
Conventional meaning undergoes primary pragmatic processes5 which 
Recanati calls modulation. Basic types of modulation include free (i.e. 
not linguistically mandated) enrichment, predicate transfer, and sense-
extension. Radical contextualism goes even further by claiming that the 
idea of an association of expressions with meanings is untenable. This is 
called generalized indexicality. Every expression contributes to the mean-
ing of a sentence by means of certain contextual factors. In my view, 
the difference between moderate and radical contextualism lies in their 
stance toward the idea of a persistent code. Radical contextualism re-
jects the idea, while moderate contextualism admits it in a constrained 
form. Radical contextualism (sometimes also called occasionalism) can 
also be seen as an effort to thoroughly re-interpret Wittgenstein’s thesis 
that meaning is use, which amounts to a rejection of Grice’s distinction 
5 Secondary pragmatic processes pertain to a derivation of implicatures.
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between what is semantically encoded and what is said (Baptista forth-
coming, 3).
 What are words associated with, then, if not with meanings? Re-
canati answers this question by offering a theory of semantic potentials 
inspired by Wittgenstein and Waismann. A word s is associated with 
a set of its legitimate uses {S1, S2,…, Sn}. If the word is newly used in a 
situation Sn+1, this new use is legitimate only if it is sufficiently similar to 
the uses already present in the set. However, similarity is a vague no-
tion. To deal with this vagueness, Recanati uses the idea of the contrast 
set which makes it possible to abstract the property in respect to which 
the situations are deemed similar or dissimilar. New legitimate uses 
enrich the original set and thereby extend the semantic potential of the 
word.6
 A code as understood by Recanati is not shared, as people cannot 
be expected to share the same semantic potential of every word. The 
sharing of semantic potential is possible only in a very limited man-
ner; e.g. learning a mother tongue can be understood as passing on 
semantic potential in a shared situation. The condition of successful 
communication is a certain similarity between the semantic potentials 
of the speaker and her addressee (together with a shared method for 
determining this similarity). Two semantic potentials are similar if, in a 
given situation, they lead to the same judgment of their legitimacy.
 Recanati’s theory is strongly behavioristic and psychological. While 
it is inspired by Wittgenstein’s conception of language, it is question-
able that it faithfully captures Wittgenstein’s ideas. However, Recanati 
is not concerned with an exegesis. More interestingly, his conception 
of language learning by association reminds one of Davidson’s re-
construction of communication in the article “A Nice Derangement 
of Epitaphs” (2005). The enrichment of semantic potential with a new 
situation could be seen as a psychological reconstruction of the transi-
tion from prior theory to passing theory. Just like Davidson, Recanati 
admits the idea of code only as a set of temporary associations that 
dynamically change during communication. The association of expres-
sions with meanings (or semantic potentials) is nothing persistent.
 A common objection against all varieties of contextualism is that, 
if its main tenets were true, communication would be impossible. Al-
though the theory of semantic potentials could seem to be an adequate 
6 Recanati (2003), compare also Bezuidenhout (2002).
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response to the objection, Recanati has come up with what he calls an 
availability principle .7 One of its many formulations is as follows:
What is said must be intuitively accessible to the conversational par-
ticipants (unless something goes wrong and they do not count as 
‘normal interpreters’). (Recanati 2004, 20)
This principle, which is a reflection of the psychological spirit of Recan-
ati’s conception of language and communication, constrains the results 
of primary pragmatic processes to those that can be “normally” expect-
ed by the participants of communication. The trouble is with the word 
“normally”.8 The communicating partners must share the same intu-
itions or at least the same criteria of normality in order to have direct 
access to what is said. If normality were determined by introspection 
(as is suggested by the unfortunate term “intuitive”), the speaker could 
not tell whether he is normal or merely believes himself to be normal, 
which results in a case of private rule following.9 However, Recanati 
suggests that, in order to judge normality, it suffices to have epistemic 
access to the following factors: (a) the sentence spoken, (b) the mean-
ing of the sentence (semantic code) and (c) relevant contextual factors 
(Recanati 2004, 20). This suffices, we are told, for the derivation of what 
is said. But then the availability principle is transcendentally deduced 
rather than psychologically observed. It plays the role of a transcenden-
tal condition of successful communication, which places even harder 
demands on communication than the respective condition in the case 
of minimalism. Recanati’s availability principle requires both a shared 
semantic code and a shared relevant context, whereas minimalism de-
mands a shared code only.
 If the theory of semantic potentials is true, the participants of com-
munication have no access to the shared meaning of a spoken sentence. 
Hence, the process of derivation of “what is said” is not shared and 
deterministic; we have no guarantee of successful communication. But 
in the fact, there can be no such guarantee in this psychological frame-
work. As Recanati reminds us, communication is a matter of “negoti-
7 This principle distinguishes Recanati from other contextualists. The rele-
vance theory comes with what it calls the principle of relevance. See e.g. Sper-
ber – Wilson (2008, 177-181).
8 This objection is raised by Cappelen – Lepore (2005, 188n.).
9 Wittgenstein (1958, §202).
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ating meaning”, seeking and approaching the perfect understanding 
(Recanati 2010a, 8).
 There is a sort of payoff here. Recanati includes contextual factors 
into his availability principle, which, on the one hand, allows him to 
keep the idea of code narrow, but, on the other hand, cannot guarantee 
successful communication. Cappelen and Lepore demand that the suc-
cess of communication cannot depend on shared context (Cappelen – 
Lepore 2005, 182-189) and communication must be possible across con-
texts. This is to understand that they exclude contextual factors from 
conditions of communication. But then they have to demand a very 
robust semantic code. The rest of my paper is devoted to reflections 
upon the idea of such a robust code.
3 Minimalism
 I admit that the goal of contemporary minimalists is unclear to me. 
While they claim they are concerned with creating a systematic seman-
tic theory,10 they respond to objections that their minimalist conception 
of meaning has no psychological reality. (Cappelen – Lepore 2005, ch. 
12) If proponents of minimalism only aimed at a systematic semantic 
theory rather than the psychological reality of the minimal meaning, 
there would be little left to disagree about.11
 Minimalism can be defined in many ways. According to Cappelen 
and Lepore, the basic idea of minimalism is simple: The semantic con-
tent of a sentence s is the same for all utterances of the sentence s .12 If a 
sentence depends on context in some way, this dependence is triggered 
semantically, as is the case with indexical expressions which belong to 
the basic set .13 Minimalism distinguishes between “what is semantically 
10 E.g. in Borg (2004, 3).
11 Recanati (2010, 12-14) claims that this form of minimalism is true by 
definition.
12 Emma Borg explicitly rejects this definition: ”I’d reject, then, the view of So-
ames (2002) and Cappelen – Lepore (2005) that minimal contents are those 
conveyed by every utterance of a sentence“. (2010b, 57)
13 This is a characterization by Cappelen – Lepore (2005, 143n); the (more radi-
cal) minimalism of Emma Borg (2009) adds the thesis that the dependence 
on context must be formally traceable. 
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expressed” (or the minimal content or meaning, minimal proposition) 
and “what is said”, where the former is part of the latter. What is se-
mantically expressed is a result of disambiguation in a broad sense and 
of the saturation of context dependent expressions. For minimalists, 
“what is said” is a pragmatic notion, whose content can significantly 
go beyond the content that is expressed semantically. The speech act 
pluralism of Cappelen and Lepore goes so far as to deny any systematic 
connection between what is semantically expressed and what is said.
 Emma Borg’s definition of minimalism is slightly different. Her 
definition of semantic content is this: “Semantic content for sentences is 
fully determined by syntactic structure and lexical content: the mean-
ing of a sentence is exhausted by the meaning of its parts and their 
mode of composition“ (2010b, 54). For Cappelen and Lepore, a process 
is pragmatic if it cannot be identified on the syntactic level of a sen-
tence; for Borg (2009, §4), a process is pragmatic if it cannot be derived 
formally using lexical information only. Finally, let us mention a defini-
tion of minimalism from one of its opponents, François Recanati, who 
labels it I-minimalism:
What is saidint is affected by the bottom-up process of saturation but 
not by top-down processes such as free enrichment. (Recanati 2010, 
14)
What is saidint is defined as the intuitive truth conditions of an ut-
terance. Thus, this variety of minimalism is concerned with the psy-
chological reality of what is said rather than merely with a systematic 
semantic theory. Crucial here is the division of processes into top-down 
and bottom-up. Roughly, a bottom-up process performs composition 
or synthesis from elements, whereas a top-down process performs 
decomposition and the analysis of a larger whole (sentence) into its 
elements. Recanati gives the following definition: “A ‘top-down’ or 
context-driven process is a pragmatic process which is not triggered 
by an expression in the sentence but takes place for purely pragmatic 
reasons”. (Recanati 2010, 4) 
 What is the relationship of this terminology to Grice’s above-men-
tioned classification? What is semantically expressed lies somewhere 
between Grice’s conventional meaning and what is said. However, if 
we remove illocutionary force from Grice’s definition of “what is said”, 
we come close to minimal content: 
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The minimal content of utterance u of sentence s (in context c) is 
defined as the M-intended truth-conditional content of sentence s (in 
context c), to whose truth the speaker is committed.
Furthermore, we need to clarify the relationship of minimal meaning 
to Davidson’s conception of meaning. Here is an obvious connection. 
Both conceptions define meaning as an abstraction over all uses. All 
that I have written above about the problems of understanding the 
scope of such quantification applies also to minimalism. If a semantic 
minimalist tries to define minimal meaning, he arrives at something 
like Davidson’s T-schema:
Utterance “A is red” semantically expresses the proposition that A is 
red. (Cappelen – Lepore 2005, 157)
 There is a worry that what all the utterances of the sentence “A is 
red” have in common is only (or above all) that they contain the sen-
tence itself. The minimal meaning, or—more specifically—minimal 
proposition, is for Cappelen and Lepore a metaphysical question in the 
sense of searching for common properties of objects that are included 
under a term (e.g. what is it that is common to all big things or all brave 
actions). Wittgenstein’s objection would be that they may have nothing 
in common at all; they are connected merely by a network of similari-
ties making up a family resemblance. Cappelen and Lepore call this po-
sition metaphysical nihilism and deem it absurd.
 What is the notion of minimal meaning good for, then? Cappelen 
and Lepore give a clear answer: “In short: the proposition semantically 
expressed is our minimal defense against confusion, misunderstand-
ing, mistakes and it is that which guarantees communication across 
contexts of utterance.” (Cappelen – Lepore 2005, 185) Thus, minimal 
meaning has the role of a transcendental condition of communication 
that was attributed to the idea of a semantic code at the beginning. Con-
textualists object that the minimal meaning so construed is “an abstrac-
tion with no psychological reality” (Recanati 2001, 88). The problem lies 
in a too broad (or unconstrained) quantification over all uses of each 
sentence. Only a finite number of utterances can enter into an abstrac-
tion of minimal proposition if it is to keep its psychological reality.
 Thus, a minimal proposition is what can be expected by an address-
ee who has no access to the context of an utterance. If there were no 
such propositions, this would not mean that communication was im-
possible, but merely that some sentences could not be understood with-
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out context, which I take to be obvious. On the contrary, the thesis that 
all sentences can be at least minimally understood without the context 
of their utterance seems absurd to me.
 What is the position of minimalism toward the idea of a semantic 
code, then? Semantic minimalism tries to be neutral: “[…] we want Se-
mantic Minimalism to be neutral between the different accounts of how 
best to assign semantic values to linguistic expressions; e.g. objects, 
sets, properties, functions, conceptual roles, stereotypes, or whatever.” 
(Cappelen – Lepore 2005, 144) A further step on the way from semantic 
code to minimal proposition is the employment of rules for the compo-
sition of meanings; here, minimalism is also neutral. In spite of all that 
neutrality, it is necessary for these meanings and rules to be shared, as 
the derivation of the minimal proposition must be deterministic (ac-
cording to E. Borg, even formal). In order for the minimal proposition 
to be able to serve as a condition of communication, we need a shared 
semantic code and shared rules of composition and saturation, even 
if minimalists are reluctant to describe the nature of the code. Thus it 
seems that semantic code and minimal proposition come rather close.
 As outlined above, homonymy and polysemy present a problem 
for understanding language as a code. Contextualism deals with these 
phenomena at the level of negotiation of meaning. In minimalism, the 
derivation of minimal meaning requires disambiguation. However, 
there is the suspicion that disambiguation is a primary pragmatic pro-
cess which enters the derivation of what is said before the determina-
tion of truth conditions.
 Cappelen and Lepore describe the derivation of the minimal propo-
sition as follows (Cappelen – Lepore 2005, 144n):
 (a) Specification of the meaning of every expression in the sentence.
 (b) Specification of the compositional rules.
 (c) Disambiguation of every ambiguous expression, where the am-
biguity is due to homonymy or polysemy.
 (d) Clarification of vague expressions.
 (e) Saturation of semantic values of every context dependent ex-
pression.
Here, disambiguation is at the same level as saturation. Thus, it is a 
sub-propositional process. If saturation is the only process at this level 
that can interact with context, disambiguation must be independent of 
context. 
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 The above-mentioned objection that it is unclear whether all utter-
ances of a sentence have something in common is not only a matter of 
metaphysics, as it is claimed by Cappelen and Lepore. The objection 
that there is nothing that all utterances of the sentence “That is a hard 
thing” have in common can be answered by a semantic minimalist as 
follows: If you have found nothing in common, it may be because the 
term “hard” has multiple meanings. Get back and perform disambigu-
ation thoroughly. In some cases, disambiguation can be done during 
the derivation of the logical form of the sentence;14 in other cases, dis-
ambiguation requires information from context such as the topic of 
conversation.
 Emma Borg (2004, 142) deals with the problem in more detail and 
proposes the following solution: Homonymous expressions need to be 
disambiguated before semantic processing, if possible. If this is not pos-
sible, it is necessary to semantically process all the varieties of mean-
ing, and pragmatically resolve them only later. Borg even allows the 
existence of homonymy that needs to be handled during semantic pro-
cessing, if it is a case of top-down feedback, i.e. the gradual exclusion of 
contextually anomalous interpretations. This process differs from real 
pragmatic processes such as free enrichment in that no further informa-
tion is added to what is said.
 Disambiguation is a bottom-up process, as it is triggered by the 
presence of a homonymous expression. A top-down process is only 
the exclusion of anomalous interpretations. In this case we have here 
something like the above-mentioned Grice’s circle by Levinson, as later 
implicatures can influence what is said. It would be devastating for the 
minimalist program if a process of disambiguation would require in-
formation that was not lexically encoded. In the following, I will try to 
argue in this direction.
 Disambiguation needs to proceed with respect to some code that 
maps each expression to a discrete set of meanings. But this is a simpli-
fication, as language meanings cannot really be understood as discrete 
sets. If meaning is holistic to an extent, criteria of identity for particu-
lar meanings cannot be exactly specified. So far I have spoken mainly 
14 The sentences “They were armed with bows” and “He bows deeply” could 
be disambiguated in this manner, for the word “bows” must be a noun in 
the former sentence and a verb in the latter.
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about the rather rare phenomenon of homonymy. By contrast, poly-
semy is a much more common phenomenon, one closely related to a 
holistic understanding of language. An expression is polysemous if it 
has multiple meanings that are in some way related, often one of the 
meanings being metonymically or metaphorically derived from an-
other. Homonymous expressions are mostly considered distinct lexical 
units (and thus in need of indexing), whereas a polysemous expres-
sion has only one entry in the lexicon. Thus, it depends on the choice 
of the code whether, and to what extent polysemous expressions are 
considered related or quite different, i.e. whether they will be reduced 
to homonymy. If the code is fine-grained enough, disambiguation that 
uses the code requires finding a correct metonymic interpretation of 
many expressions.
 Let us have a look at how the phenomenon of metaphor and me-
tonymy is approached by minimalists, namely Emma Borg (2001). The 
interpretation of metaphor is based on a figurative interpretation func-
tion which assigns the set of (all) possible interpretations p1…pn to each 
literal meaning of metaphor p together with conceptual framework 
α: 
 f〈p,α〉 = { p1…pn } 
A conceptual framework is made up of relationships between concepts 
that are common in the given community or concepts of the particular 
speaker. Importantly, these relationships can depend on information 
that is not lexically encoded, i.e. on knowledge of the world. In the sec-
ond step, a subset of those interpretations that are relevant in the given 
context needs to be chosen. The contextual factor c comes into play:
 fc〈p,α, c〉 = { pc1…p
c
n }
This second step, which involves the restriction of interpretations that 
are unsuitable in the given context, is analogical to the above-mentioned 
top-down feedback, in which anomalous interpretations of homony-
mous expressions are excluded. This process poses no problems for the 
minimalist derivation of meaning. 
 What is important for further consideration is the first step. If find-
ing metaphorical interpretations requires extra-linguistic information, 
this information is probably in some way contained in the interpre-
tations. If the same process of interpretation were active with polyse-
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mous expressions, we would be dealing with a truly pragmatic process 
that precedes the determination of truth conditions, which would be 
fatal for minimalism. 
 Disambiguation of homonymous expressions is activated on the 
syntactic or semantic level and is mandatory (even if it were performed 
only after semantic processing). By contrast, disambiguation of polyse-
mous expressions is not always mandatory. Thus, it can be governed 
only by pragmatic decisions. Consequently, the semantic information 
contained in a semantic code is insufficient for a complete determina-
tion of the meaning of an utterance, typically for truth conditions. But 
is this really the case?
 This is exactly what contextualists claim. One of their types of mod-
ulation is “predicate transfer” or “metonymic transfer” (Recanati 2010, 
166-168). It is a typically top-down process which is in many cases op-
tional, i.e. it is triggered purely pragmatically. Recanati gives the fol-
lowing example:
There is a lion in the courtyard.
The expression “lion” can refer to a living lion or it can be metonymi-
cally transferred to a statue of a lion. A further metonymic transfer is 
possible, by which “lion” refers to a person born under the sign of Leo. 
Thus, the expression “lion” is polysemous in this way. Polysemy can 
even be defined as conventionalized modulation (Recanati 2010, 70n). 
This is where a way out for minimalism could be found. If it were pos-
sible to conventionalize all the information that is contained in polyse-
mous expressions, there would be no need for pragmatic decisions. If 
we reduced polysemy to homonymy, the conceptual relations that, ac-
cording to Emma Borg, are necessary for metaphorical interpretations 
would be lost. If minimalists succeed in including these relations into a 
semantic code, disambiguation of polysemous expressions would not 
be counted a primary pragmatic process.
 The last sentences of the previous paragraph are stated using con-
ditionals, as I do not know of a conception of code robust enough to 
include all conceptual relations. It is an open question whether such a 
code can be constructed using finite means. Even if this were possible, 
it is unclear that such a code would be psychologically adequate (for 
instance, because of massive parallelism). 
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4 Minimalism Is (Radical) Contextualism
 From the above discussion, it could seem that there are only a cou-
ple of varieties of contextualism and minimalism which cover all the 
possible semantic and pragmatic approaches to formulating a system-
atic theory of meaning and its interaction with context. This, of course, 
is not the case. Minimalism and contextualism are merely extreme posi-
tions in some sense, and there are several approaches to the unification 
of their various features.15
 One group of approaches includes theories that extend the basic set 
of indexical expressions (as understood by minimalism) with further 
expressions or classes of expressions. Among these, let us mention 
Jason Stanley’s theory of hidden indexical expressions, which places 
further indexical parameters on the sentence level, or the predicate in-
dexicalism of Rothschild and Segal, which extends the set of indexical 
expressions with predicate expressions. In indexicalism, these further 
indexical expressions can be detected using syntactic methods and all 
semantic content has a propositional character (similarly as in minimal-
ism).
 Another group of approaches includes theories that extend the con-
cept of proposition with a further parameter whose content needs to be 
gained from context. Thus, truth values depend not only on the pos-
sible world but also on a further parameter (we can call it a general-
ized proposition). If the proposition expressed in sentence p varies with 
context, it is possible to add this further parameter. The generalized 
proposition thereby becomes context invariant. It is a typically seman-
tic approach consisting in an effort to capture context dependence by 
semantic means.16
 An example of this approach is the non-indexical contextualism of 
John MacFarlane (2007). It extends proposition with a “count-as” pa-
rameter as a function from properties (resp. expressions that stand for 
properties) to intentions. For each property (e.g. big), the intention that 
15 An overview of various positions can be found in Borg (2010a).
16 We can distinguish two kinds of context dependence: An expression 
or sentence is context dependent if it has different meanings in different 
contexts or if its truth depends on context. By adding a further parameter to 
proposition, we convert the former kind of context dependence to the latter 
one. Compare Cappelen – Lepore (2005, 146) or MacFarlane (2007).
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is expressed by the property (e.g. big for a dog) is determined using 
context. This approach is reminiscent of Recanati’s proposal to include 
a contrast set. As is admitted by MacFarlane himself, his proposal ap-
proaches radical contextualism, whose basic tenet is that a proposition 
is created only in context. We can see that a small modification of, or 
a small departure from semantic minimalism leads directly to radical 
contextualism.
 The following line of argumentation is typical of proponents of min-
imalism (as an instance of modus tollens):17
Even a small departure from minimalism collapses into radical  
contextualism.
Radical contextualism is absurd and internally inconsistent.
No reasonable modification of minimalism is possible.
Proponents of radical contextualism can turn the argument the other 
way around while keeping the first premise:
Even a small departure from minimalism collapses into radical  
contextualism.
Semantic minimalism is inadequate and in need of modification.
Radical contextualism is the only acceptable position.
 Both these arguments suggest that there is not much of a difference 
between minimalism and radical contextualism. If minimalists failed to 
solve the problems connected with the disambiguation of polysemous 
expressions, minimalism would collapse into radical contextualism 
without any modification. Thus, the notion of a code is at a crossroads. 
If a code robust enough to deal with polysemy could be created, mini-
malist conceptions would present a new impetus towards understand-
ing language as a code. If such a code could not be created, very little 
would be left of the notion of a persistent code, other than perhaps a 
provisional code that could, for a certain time and in a certain language 
community, help in interpreting meaning or be active in the process of 
creating it. As Davidson has already claimed, it is a practical crutch.18
17 This is the main argument from Cappelen – Lepore (2005, 14) and also from 
Borg (2010a).
18 Supported by project GACR P401/11/P174.
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